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China is the key emerging market 
for international technology 
companies. Smart, well-informed IP 
and business strategies are required 
if companies are to make the most 
of what the country has to offer
By David Llewelyn and Peter J Williamson
China’s IP protection 
minefield: separating 
fact from fiction
The boards of many foreign companies are 
counting on a share of China’s market to 
support their top-line growth in coming 
years. However, they should be aware that 
engaging in the Chinese market will expose 
their high-value technologies, trade secrets 
and know-how to the risks and vagaries of 
the Chinese IP environment.
There are several reasons for this. First, 
Chinese companies have begun to establish 
R&D centres overseas and to acquire high-
tech companies which give them access 
to both existing technology and ongoing 
R&D and design capabilities. Chinese 
acquisitions abroad exceeded $105 billion 
in 2013. Of these, industrial acquisitions 
– which focus on acquiring technology 
and R&D capacity – accounted for 20%. 
These acquisitions are helping Chinese 
companies to close the technology gap 
with multinationals, meaning that foreign 
companies will increasingly need to deploy 
state-of-the-art intellectual property to 
compete successfully in China.
Second, the Chinese government has 
embarked on a clear policy of strengthening 
innovation capabilities within China. Given 
its huge foreign exchange reserves and 
lack of need for foreign capital, this means 
that the Chinese government is unwilling 
to approve foreign investments that do 
not bring leading-edge technology and 
intellectual property into China.
Third, more foreign companies are 
expanding their R&D, innovation and 
design activities in China to take advantage 
of lower costs, the local availability of 
engineers and scientists, and distinctive 
local know-how – especially when it 
comes to creating products and services 
that are suitable for China and other 
emerging markets. Recent statistics 
identify at least 1,200 foreign R&D centres 
located in China, with investment in these 
facilities totalling $12.8 billion. Many 
are now responsible for developing new 
products and technologies, rather than 
making a limited contribution to global 
projects (Figure 1).
These developments mean that foreign 
companies need to find effective ways to 
manage an ever-greater quantity of higher-
value intellectual property in China.
IP risks in China 
EF Kluft & Co agreed to let a Chinese 
partner market its line of luxury mattresses, 
which sell for between $3,500 and $70,000 
and which are designed and manufactured 
by Kluft in California. Strong initial 
sales quickly declined as retailers started 
displaying suspiciously similar designs 
from competing brands. Lacking any design 
protection in China, Kluft’s only option 
was to terminate the agreement. However, 
pictures of its designs remained on display. 
Some have argued that the prevalence of 
copying in China reflects deep-seated 
cultural attitudes which do not merely value 
originality, but view the art of reproduction 
as equally demanding and, when carried out 
exquisitely, perhaps even superior – Qin 
Shihuangdi, the first ruler to unify the core 
kingdoms of China, was famous for building 
a replica of every former ruler’s palace 
outside his own capital of Xianyang after 
each conquest.
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tends to be high (Figure 2). In June 2013, 
for example, China’s largest wind turbine 
producer Sinovel and two of its executives 
were charged in a US federal court with 
stealing trade secrets from its former 
software supplier, Massachusetts-based 
American Superconductor (AMSC). 
The suit was initiated after a former 
employee of AMSC pleaded guilty in 
Austria to stealing source code for turbine 
controllers. Sinovel’s deputy director of 
R&D Su Liying, its technology manager 
Zhao Haichun and former AMSC employee 
Dejan Karabasevic were each charged 
with conspiracy to commit trade secret 
theft, theft of trade secrets and wire 
fraud. AMSC claims that Sinovel used its 
software in four Sinovel turbines installed 
in the United States less than 40 miles 
from AMSC’s global headquarters, which 
its president described as showing “not 
only a blatant disrespect for intellectual 
property but a disregard for international 
trade law”.
Given that the IP exposures associated 
with operating in, or even supplying to, 
the China market are significant, two 
questions arise. First, what legal protection 
is available from the Chinese IP regime in 
practice? Second, what other pragmatic 
strategies might companies adopt to 
reduce the likelihood or negative impacts 
of IP leakage associated with doing 
business in China?
Strengths and weaknesses of China’s IP 
regime 
Although China joined the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) 
in 1980, it was only after 1992 that 
broad-ranging IP laws, regulations and 
administrative procedures were established. 
These were subsequently refined so that 
today China has a comprehensive IP 
protection regime. Intellectual property can 
also be protected by recourse to China’s 
unfair competition and trade secret laws 
and regulations.
This IP protection system is now 
actively used. According to the latest 
published statistics, the State Intellectual 
Property Office (SIPO) received 825,000 
invention patent applications in 2013, 
a 26.3% increase on the previous year. 
Some 85% of these were from domestic 
applicants (including applicants from 
Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao). SIPO had 
a total of 2,954 patent examiners in 2011 
(compared with 6,300 at the US Patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO) for that 
year), with plans to increase the number 
to 9,000 by 2015. SIPO granted 205,000 
Other risks of IP leakage in China 
are more complex and nuanced. In 2004 
the Ministry of Railways embarked on a 
long-term development plan to invest $293 
billion building 18,000 kilometres (km) of 
dedicated high-speed rail lines by 2015. By 
the end of 2013, some 10,500km of high-
speed rail was already operational, but the 
source of the technology remains a matter 
of controversy. German news magazine Der 
Spiegel has argued that: “using both the 
political bait of forming joint ventures and 
deft negotiating tactics, China attracted 
leading Western engineering companies to 
China – such as Siemens from Germany, 
Alstom from France, Bombardier from 
Canada and Kawasaki from Japan. Once 
it had these foreign companies where it 
wanted them, it played them off against 
each other so that they would relinquish 
key pieces of technological know-how at a 
low price.” 
Kawasaki Heavy Industries (KHI) 
cooperated with its Chinese partner, 
China South Car (CSR), to produce high-
speed trains. However, within two years 
of commencing operations, CSR began 
producing similar models independently 
with no assistance from KHI. According 
to CSR President Zhang Chenghong, CSR 
“made the bold move of forming a systemic 
development platform for high-speed 
locomotives and further upgrading its 
design and manufacturing technology. 
Later, we began to independently develop 
high-speed trains with a maximum velocity 
of 300-350 kms per hour, which eventually 
rolled off the production line in December 
2007.” Since then, CSR has ended its 
Chinese cooperation with KHI.
The Chinese company points out 
that it has adapted and developed the 
transferred technology and filed more than 
940 applications for patents of its own. 
It also argues that foreign train makers 
are fully aware that technology transfer is 
an important aspect of gaining access to 
the China market, and that the Ministry 
of Railways has now ordered over 400 
new-generation trains from joint ventures 
involving Siemens and Bombardier. 
At risk from these practices are not only 
patented technology and design blueprints, 
but also trade secrets or confidential 
information (eg, how to make a product) 
which are often valuable to competitors. 
Trade secrets are especially exposed 
because many literally walk out the door in 
the heads of employees, no matter what an 
employment contract may say.
This is a particular problem in China, 
where employee turnover across sectors 
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(global leadership for
specific products/
technologies)
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Figure 1. The role of foreign R&D units in 
China
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qualified specialist judges and experienced 
IP lawyers and advocates in China, 
particularly in less developed provinces 
– which have also been accused of local 
protectionism.
Despite these problems, the aggregate 
data suggests that foreign litigants do in 
fact have a good record of success in IP 
litigation in China, winning between 90% 
and 95% of reported cases on average across 
all Chinese courts. Another study of patent 
cases in 2010 found that the probability 
of a foreign litigant winning was 60% 
when the opposing party was a Chinese 
entity. Chinese IP trials also tend to be 
quicker and cheaper than those in common 
law countries. Chinese patent cases, for 
example, often take just six months from 
filing the complaint to trial and another 
three months for appeal, compared to a 
norm of several years in the United States. 
One reason for this is that there are no 
juries (as is the case in the United States); 
nor is there the potentially lengthy pre-trial 
process (‘discovery’ in the United States 
and ‘disclosure’ in the United Kingdom). 
Chinese trials are much closer to those in 
continental European countries with roots 
in Roman law where a presiding judge runs 
cases tightly.
Chinese administrative processes can 
also be used to avoid taking a dispute 
to court by directly requesting the 
local authorities in charge of enforcing 
intellectual property for redress against 
infringement. This enforcement route is 
generally cheap, quick and simple (the 
maximum time for submissions and action 
is set at four months). Local authorities 
can impose an injunction and mediate 
(but not compel) the payment of damages. 
If mediation fails, the patentee can then 
invention patents in 2013 (down by 4.1% 
on the previous year due to more stringent 
vetting) – with 55% going to domestic 
applicants and 45% to foreign applicants. 
However, relying solely on legal 
protection is not viable for most 
companies in China. This is not because 
of any deficiencies in the legislative 
framework – although there are some 
peculiarities with Chinese IP laws 
compared with practice elsewhere. For 
example, China’s Trademark Law follows 
the first-to-file rule, which stipulates that 
a trademark is granted to the party that 
files first, rather than the party that first 
uses the trademark, as in the United States. 
This disparity can result in trademark 
squatting, when local Chinese businesses 
and individuals are granted trademarks for 
foreign products – a problem complicated 
by numerous alternative Chinese 
translations or transliterations of foreign 
trademarks.
However, in general, Chinese IP 
legislation is closely aligned with 
international standards – in part 
because revisions have been shaped by 
the conclusion of international treaties. 
Sometimes China is even ahead in 
legislative terms – for example, it adopted 
the first-to-file rule for patents (as used 
in Europe and elsewhere) in its original 
legislation. This was not incorporated into 
US law until the passage of the Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act in 2011.
Instead, the two main factors limiting 
reliance on the legal and regulatory regime for 
IP protection in China are the practicalities of 
enforcement in many parts of a huge country 
and the fact that much critical intellectual 
property belonging to foreign companies 
takes the form of trade secrets.
Enforcement 
Specialised IP courts have been established 
in major cities and provinces to handle IP 
infringement cases. In 2013 the Chinese 
courts handled a total of 100,399 first-
instance IP cases. Nonetheless, there has 
been much criticism of the reliability of 
the processes and judgments of the IP 
courts. China uses a civil (not common) 
law system, where little to no deference is 
given to prior decisions of judges facing 
the same issues. In theory, each judge 
reading the same statute is expected 
to arrive at the same interpretation. Of 
course, as in any legal system, this is 
often not the case in practice. Instead, 
the lack of precedent results in divergent 
interpretations from different courts. 
This can be exacerbated by a shortage of 
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Figure 2. Trade secrets exposure – high employee turnover in China
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damages of Rmb900,000 ($140,000). 
To use this legal route, the first 
step is to identify information that can 
justifiably be regarded as a trade secret. 
Documents or electronic formats containing 
this information need to be labelled as 
confidential or encrypted, and where 
possible securely stored and their transfer 
and sharing logged. Employee manuals and 
employment contracts must be drafted 
so as to be consistent with the burden of 
proof required by Chinese trade secret 
laws (eg, making it clear how confidential 
information should be handled and 
emphasising to employees that they have a 
duty of confidentiality).
It is also necessary to scan the market 
continually and visit suppliers to identify 
fake or copied products as soon as possible 
after they appear on the market. This 
includes attending trade shows, monitoring 
e-commerce sites such as Alibaba and 
making mock purchase calls.  
However, even if it is possible to 
invoke the relevant legal protection, the 
damages awarded can be inadequate. 
In a case recently publicised by the UK 
Intellectual Property Office concerning 
integrated circuit (IC) cards, the people’s 
court agreed that a foreign company’s IC 
card technology was a trade secret and that, 
based on evidence found on computers, 
a former employee had used it to help 
establish a competitor making an almost 
identical product. Despite this, the court 
awarded damages of only Rmb136,450 
(approximately $22,000 ). 
Given these limitations, it is often 
advisable to enforce IP protection outside 
China. Ford Motor Company became aware 
that Xiang Dong Yu, a former Ford product 
engineer from 1997 to 2007, intended to 
return to the United States in 2011. Ford 
had evidence that before he told Ford of 
his new job in early 2007, Yu had copied 
some 4,000 Ford documents onto an 
external hard drive, including sensitive 
designs that cost millions of dollars and 
decades of research to develop. On entering 
the United States, Yu was arrested, based 
on information provided by Ford, and 
was eventually sentenced to 70 months 
imprisonment in Michigan and fined 
$12,500 for stealing trade secrets.
However, even a comprehensive set of 
procedures that makes use of both Chinese 
and foreign laws usually needs to be 
supplemented with other strategies.
Navigating the minefield
A pragmatic approach to navigating the 
IP minefield in China must start with 
sue the infringer in court. Initially, many 
companies found that local authorities 
were reluctant to pursue enforcement, 
but in the last few years the enforcement 
capacity of local IP offices has improved 
significantly.
Therefore, foreign companies should 
not assume that IP rights are unobtainable 
or unenforceable in China, or that Chinese 
courts will always favour Chinese parties 
over foreign parties. However, in common 
with much of the rest of the world, the 
system is imperfect and sometimes 
unpredictable. These limitations are 
exacerbated when a company’s valuable 
intellectual property takes the form of 
trade secrets.
Protecting trade secrets in China 
China instituted a legal framework for the 
protection of trade secrets under the Anti-
unfair Competition Law in 1993, which 
was further clarified in January 2007. In 
lay terms, Chinese law states that a trade 
secret cannot be something known by the 
general public or by competitors. It must 
give you a competitive advantage or be 
capable of generating economic benefit, and 
you must have taken reasonable measures 
to protect the confidentiality of the 
information.
General Electric (GE) was one of the 
first foreign firms to successfully bring 
an action under the new provisions, 
in a 2007 case involving its medical 
systems business. GE discovered that 
an ex-employee was offering training 
courses using GE’s trade secrets. It 
filed a complaint with the Hangzhou 
Administration for Industry and 
Commerce, which duly inspected the 
training company’s premises, resulting 
in the seizure of a large quantity of 
GE materials. Using this evidence, GE 
subsequently brought a case against the 
ex-employee in the People’s Court of Xi’an 
for misappropriating trade secrets and 
copyright infringement. The court ruled in 
favour of GE and ordered an injunction and 
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suppliers or partners in order for them 
to support and perhaps even adapt and 
improve your product or service effectively. 
Decisions can be taken about what needs 
to be shared and what can remain in a black 
box. A helpful rule of thumb is to share the 
interfaces but not the core and, as one IP 
lawyer experienced in China recommends, 
“transfer that part [of the IP] that is most 
easily reverse engineered or easily dissected”.
Separating hardware from software may 
also be an effective strategy. An increasing 
number of products, including industrial 
machinery, cannot function effectively 
unless the hardware and software work 
together in concert. Some companies 
therefore retain elements of the software 
on secure servers overseas to reduce the 
risk that imitators can achieve the same 
performance even if they copy the hardware. 
Continually updating this remotely hosted 
software further reduces the probability of 
damaging imitation.
When AMSC opened a factory in 
China to assemble power convertors for 
wind turbines, it took the precaution 
of separating out software and keeping 
the source code for its control system 
on a secure server at its R&D centre in 
Klagenfurt, Austria. It is perhaps testament 
to the effectiveness of this strategy that 
one of AMSC’s former Chinese customers, 
Sinovel, is alleged to have contracted to 
pay $1.7 million in 2011 for access to the 
software to a rogue AMSC engineer working 
at the Klagenfurt centre, who stole it, as we 
have already described.
Even where it is necessary to share 
many product details (or where these 
can be understood by deconstructing the 
final product), it may be possible to keep 
secret the knowledge required for product 
development in order to stay ahead of 
imitators as new generations evolve.
Upfront agreements to share markets 
internationally
One strategy to mitigate the risk that the 
Chinese partner will eventually become a 
recognition that technological upgrading 
– including the promotion of spill-overs 
from foreign investment – is a key pillar 
of China’s development policy (sometimes 
through requirements for technology 
transfer as a condition for participation in 
major projects).
Some companies believe that the 
solution is simply to avoid taking their 
intellectual property, including trade 
secrets, to China – even if this means 
forgoing opportunities for revenue and 
profits or limiting their involvement purely 
to the export of final products to China. 
However, intense competition from both 
Chinese and foreign rivals means that 
a pure export strategy is less and less 
viable. Moreover, even attempts to protect 
intellectual property by keeping it walled off 
back at home do not ensure that a product’s 
advantages cannot be matched in China. 
Modern communication systems easily 
enable local companies to view intellectual 
property that has been registered overseas. 
Many Chinese companies have large 
numbers of staff devoted to tracking new 
developments in relevant scientific and 
technological fields around the world. 
There is a large pool of scientists and 
engineers who are exceptionally skilled and 
experienced in developing parallel products 
which match the performance of the 
foreign counterparts without necessarily 
violating IP rights. Chinese companies 
have also become adept at taking a product 
or service concept and developing parallel 
innovations of their own which can deliver 
the benefits using different technologies 
and approaches. Alibaba, for example, 
has developed its own infrastructure and 
technologies to deliver the same concepts 
that underlie PayPal and eBay – often 
taking the functionality of these well 
beyond the original idea. So simply trying 
to lock up intellectual property, technology 
and know-how at home does not guarantee 
that the customer benefits will not be 
replicated in China by other means.
We believe that a more effective 
approach, which also opens the way to 
seizing opportunities in the Chinese 
market, is to adopt a strategy of ongoing 
engagement using a mix of approaches for 
both exploiting and protecting intellectual 
property in China. These are outlined below.
Compartmentalising intellectual 
property and R&D 
The starting point of this strategy is 
to identify what aspects of intellectual 
property and associated knowledge need 
to be shared with Chinese distributors, 
 Even attempts to protect intellectual 
property by keeping it walled off back at 
home do not ensure that a product’s 
advantages cannot be matched in China 
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Staged timetables for technology 
transfer
Another strategy for managing IP risks is 
to agree a timetable to manage the speed of 
technology transfer to a Chinese partner. 
In 1999, for example, Airbus signed an 
agreement with China Aviation Industry 
Corporation (AVIC), under which Airbus 
would transfer manufacturing technologies 
and production lines used to manufacture 
A320 wing components, with the objective 
of enabling China to manufacture whole 
wings. This agreement specified a staggered 
transfer of technology over seven years. The 
first two phases included technology for the 
manufacture of the fixed leading and trailing 
edges of the wing, respectively. In the third 
phase, Airbus placed more engineers in its 
Chinese partner’s factories to enable local 
manufacture of the wing box. By July 2007 
the first China-made A319 wing box was 
delivered to Airbus.
This approach was replicated when 
Airbus began manufacturing its A320 family 
of aircraft in China in a joint venture with 
AVIC in 2008. Initially the aircraft was 
assembled in China from kits, with 95% of 
the parts imported as sub-modules, already 
painted and with the seats installed. From 
that starting point, “one by one we start 
to transfer parts, but each subassembly 
is a complex project – it takes five years”, 
the general manager of Airbus’s assembly 
operation in Tianjin was quoted as saying 
in 2013.
Reciprocal sharing obligations 
In seeking to mitigate the risks of IP 
leakage, it also important to recognise that 
working with Chinese partners can result in 
the base technology being improved locally. 
Chinese parties often bring complementary 
skills and a deep understanding of local 
customer needs, which can stimulate 
derivative innovations. IP strategies 
should be designed to make sure that your 
company can capture a share of the rights to 
these improvements. 
The China General Nuclear Power 
Company, for example, enhanced the French 
900 megawatt electrical (MWe) three-
cooling-loop reactor design transferred to 
China by French nuclear company Areva in 
the 1990s into a more powerful and more 
cost-efficient 1,000MWe CPR-1000 design. 
The new design was quickly deployed, with 
15 units under construction by June 2010. 
Areva’s partnership agreement enabled it 
to share the IP rights for the new design, 
which it is reported to be considering 
marketing outside China as a way of 
unlocking other emerging markets.
new competitor in the global market using 
intellectual property resulting from the 
initial cooperation is to agree upfront an 
arrangement to divide up international 
markets for the resulting products. 
Typically, the Chinese partner will be 
given the rights to sell the products in 
China and potentially other emerging 
markets where its capabilities and 
experience in marketing and distribution 
are most relevant. The foreign partner, 
meanwhile, might retain the rights to 
sell the products in its home market and 
other developed markets where it has 
established distribution networks. For 
the foreign party, such agreements have 
the advantage – subject to antitrust 
considerations – that any violations can 
be pursued through courts outside China. 
For example, when HUYA Bioscience 
International (San Diego) entered into 
a co-development agreement with 
Shenzhen Chipscreen Biosciences for a 
prospective cancer treatment, Chidamide, 
it was agreed that Chipscreen would 
retain the marketing rights in China, with 
HUYA retaining the remaining global 
marketing rights.
In other cases the parties could agree 
that sales into the global market will 
be made by a joint venture rather than 
independently. This was the case when 
Chicago-based Velsicol Chemical LLC, 
a leading specialty chemical company, 
announced a joint venture with ECOD 
Specialties Co, Ltd of Wuhan, China in 
October 2013. The joint venture is located 
in Wuhan and will not only manufacture, 
but also sell its environmentally friendly 
plasticisers globally, with Velsicol acting as 
its sole marketing agent worldwide.
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were doomed to failure in China and 
changed tack. It upgraded the R&D centre 
it had first established in China back in 
1998 and then set about repairing relations 
with the Chinese government, including 
agreeing in 2002 to give government 
officials controlled access to the source 
code for Windows and certain technical 
information needed to assuage concerns 
about software security.
Through a series of high-level meetings 
Microsoft also learned the importance 
that the government placed on developing 
China’s software industry. From 2002 it 
agreed to invest $750 million over three 
years in joint ventures and university 
laboratories, training programmes for 
teachers and software entrepreneurs, 
working with the Ministry of Education to 
finance 100 model computer classrooms 
in rural areas and making Shanghai a 
global centre for responding to customer 
emails. It also adapted its pricing strategy 
and began to offer extremely low-priced 
software bundles for segments such as 
students.
Microsoft’s then newly appointed 
country head for China, Tim Chen, 
described the shift: “We started changing 
the perception that Microsoft is the 
company coming just to do anti-piracy and 
sue people. We changed the company’s 
image. We’re the company that has the 
long-term vision. If a foreign company’s 
strategy matches with the government’s 
development agenda, the government will 
support you, even if they don’t like you.”
The new strategy began to pay 
dividends. The Chinese government 
required central, provincial, and local 
authorities to begin using legitimate 
software (eg, by 2006 the city of Beijing 
Implementing complementary HR 
policies
Given the significance of trade secrets 
and their inextricable links to the 
motivations and actions of staff, HR 
policies must also be part of any overall 
IP strategy. High growth in China means 
that many employees aspire to rapid career 
advancement and keep a close eye on 
their progression relative to their peers. 
Unless policies provide opportunities for 
continuous learning and a clear career 
ladder, retention will be impaired and 
trade secrets will keep flowing out of 
the door. Programmes therefore need to 
be designed both for ongoing training 
and for comparing internal and external 
candidates for vacancies when they occur, 
taking the likely impact on intellectual 
property into account.
It is also often useful to address the 
risk of trade secret leakage from the other 
direction: trying to convince employees 
that proprietary knowledge is unlikely to 
be of value if taken out of the context of 
the company, its products and brand equity. 
This means emphasising in both internal 
and external communications that the 
company’s value proposition is underpinned 
by the total package that customers receive, 
rather than by a specific technology or a 
particular product alone. 
Aligning IP strategy with government 
policy
Aligning one’s IP protection strategy 
with Chinese government policy almost 
inevitably involves adjustments and 
compromises. However, a strategy that is 
in tune with the flow of the river is much 
more likely to deliver long-term success 
than one that is continually fighting against 
it. This is well demonstrated by Microsoft’s 
experience in the early 2000s.
In 1992 Microsoft formally began 
offering its software in China. Its 
strategy was to sell products at prices 
similar to those it charged elsewhere 
in the world. Windows and Office were 
adopted enthusiastically, but almost 
all of the installations were pirated. 
Microsoft’s immediate response of 
taking counterfeiters to court attracted 
unwelcome publicity, to the point 
where even its former country manager 
described the company as “arrogant 
and selfish” and “an enemy of Chinese 
consumers”. As a result, the Chinese 
government began actively promoting a 
Chinese version of Linux.
By 2001 Microsoft realised that its 
usual pricing and IP protection strategies 
When developing IP strategies for China, 
technology companies should focus on the 
following key points:
• Take a pragmatic, multi-pronged 
approach while recognising that 
technological upgrading is a key pillar 
of China’s development policy.
• Utilise the legal protection available in 
China, but do not depend solely upon it.
• Actively pursue Chinese infringers 
outside China as soon as they venture 
abroad.
• Agree with Chinese partners upfront 
how to share markets internationally.
• Compartmentalise proprietary know-
how, transferring only some of the 
pieces to China.
• Implement a staged timetable for 
technology transfer in discrete 
packages.
• Incorporate reciprocal obligations 
for Chinese partners to share 
their innovations or incremental 
improvements.
• Implement complementary human 
resource management policies to 
reduce the leakage of trade secrets.
• Try to align your strategy as far as 
possible with Chinese government 
policy.
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sometimes inconsistent enforcement and 
the importance of trade secrets, which 
are difficult to protect by legal means 
the world over, means that rigorous IP 
management needs to be supplemented by 
the pragmatic strategies described above.
Ultimately, the best protection is to stay 
ahead of the competition as each new cycle 
of innovation unfolds. However, a well-
crafted and pragmatic strategy to navigate 
China’s IP minefield can help to make sure 
that you profit before the competition 
catches up with the last wave.  
had completed the shift). It also required 
local PC manufacturers to load legitimate 
software on their computers (previously 
even the market leader, Lenovo, had been 
shipping 90% of its machines naked – 
with no operating system installed). By 
2007 Microsoft estimated that the number 
of new machines shipped with legitimate 
software nationwide had risen from about 
20% to more than 40%. While Microsoft’s 
China revenues are reported to average 
no more than $7 for every PC in use 
(compared with between $100 and $200 
in developed countries), its experience 
suggests that aligning IP strategy with 
government policy is a valuable part of the 
toolkit in China.
The art of the possible
China has strong legislation to protect 
intellectual property and serious efforts 
should be made to ensure that your 
company is successfully utilising the legal 
protection available, both inside China and 
abroad. However, a combination of patchy, 
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